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Abstract
In this paper we provide a framework that explains how the market risk premium,
defined as the difference between forward prices and spot forecasts, depends on the
risk preferences of market players and the interaction between buyers and sellers.
In commodities markets this premium is an important indicator of the behavior of
buyers and sellers and their views on the market spanning between short-term and
long-term horizons. We show that under certain assumptions it is possible to derive
explicit solutions that link levels of risk aversion and market power with market prices
of risk and the market risk premium. We apply our model to the German electricity
market and show that the market risk premium exhibits a term structure which can
be explained by the combination of two factors. Firstly, the levels of risk aversion
of buyers and sellers, and secondly, how the market power of producers, relative to
that of buyers, affects forward prices with different delivery periods.
Keywords: Contango, backwardation, market price of risk, electricity forwards, mar-
ket risk premium, forward risk premium, forward bias, market power.
1 Introduction
Commodities are a very different asset class from the more traditional classes of traded
assets such as equities and bonds. Commodities normally encompass physical goods such
as oil, gas, electricity, metals, agriculturals and live stock. The physical nature of com-
modities is perhaps one of their most defining characteristics specifically because it plays
an important role in the behavior of their prices in both the spot and forward markets.
Let us contrast equity forwards with commodity forwards. For example, if interest
rates and dividends are assumed to be deterministic, the pricing of equity forwards is a
straightforward exercise. Simple no-arbitrage arguments are employed and the pricing is
principally based on the ability to borrow money to purchase the underlying equity and
hold it until delivery. As a result, the arbitrage-free forward price is the cost of borrowing
net of dividends yielded by the equity. With commodities one can in principle apply a
similar strategy to price forward contracts. However the physical nature of commodities
makes it very difficult for two reasons. First, the cost-of-carry (interest plus ‘storage’
costs) is not straightforward to calculate or measure. Second, it is necessary to account
for the convenience yield (equivalent to collection of dividends on equities) but this is also
exceptionally difficult to quantify or model.
The shape of commodities’ forward curves for different delivery periods has always been
of utmost importance to understand market players’ (producers, consumers and specula-
tors) ‘attitudes’ towards bearing risk in these markets. Forwards exhibit peculiar behavior
depending on the time or delivery period. A situation where forward prices are above
current spot prices is labeled contango and it is normally associated with circumstances
where the immediate supply of the commodity is plentiful relative to demand. Similarly,
the situation where forward prices are below spot prices is known as backwardation and it is
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generally associated with circumstances of low current supply levels and / or low inventory
levels. One can determine whether contango or backwardation exists by simple observation
of the forward markets. For example, in electricity and gas markets one normally observes
that, for ‘long’ dated forward contracts, markets are in backwardation and for ‘shorter’
maturities the market is in contango [2] [3].
Another quantity of importance that relates forward and expected spot prices is the
market risk premium or forward bias π(t, T ). This is defined as the difference, calculated
at time t, between the forward price F (t, T ), at time t with delivery at T , and the expected
spot price:
π(t, T ) = F (t, T )− EP [S(T )|Ft]. (1.1)
Here EP is the expectation operator, under the historical measure P , with information up
until time t and S(T ) is the spot price at time T .1
To the best of our knowledge, recent literature on commodities has not addressed the
connection between the market risk premium and market players’ behavior and risk pref-
erences. Moreover, it has not dealt with the question of why and how in some commodities
markets we expect the market risk premium π(t, T ) to change signs in time T . The main
contribution of this article is therefore to address these questions and propose a frame-
work that allows us to establish explicit relationships between the market risk premium,
the market price of risk and market players’ risk preferences. By doing so, this allows us
to explain the interesting connections between forward price formation and its deviations
from spot forecasts based on the consumers’ and producers’ attitudes to risk.
To understand the importance of the market risk premium, it is important to point
out that forward curves are not forecasts of the commodity spot price in the future. The
clearing prices of forwards are the result of demand and supply, which in turn are deter-
mined by the individual characteristics of market players. Indeed the main motivation
for players to engage in forward contracts is that of risk diversification. Producers have
made large investments with the aim of recouping them over a long period of time as well
as making a return on them. As with any other investments, there is an incentive for
producers to reduce variability in their profits by trading in instruments with payoffs that
covary with their profits. Similarly, consumers (which might be intermediaries and/or use
the commodity in their production process) also have an incentive to hedge their positions
in the market by contracting forwards that help diversify their risks.
The relative appetite of producers and consumers for risk-diversification has a tem-
poral dimension to it. Variations in this appetite for risk diversification will be evident
in the different levels of market exposure chosen by producers and consumers and in the
different levels chosen by members within each of these groups. For example a producer
will generally be exposed to market uncertainty for a longer period of time, perhaps de-
termined by the remaining life of its assets, whilst consumers will tend to make decisions
based on a shorter time scale. In other words, the gains in terms of risk-diversification for
consumers and producers will vary across time, therefore having a first order impact on
1Note that it is incorrect to say that when pi(t, T ) < 0 (resp. pi(t, T ) > 0) the forward curve is in
contango (resp. backwardation). Moreover, S(t) is not generally a martingale under P .
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forward clearing prices.
In this article we argue that it is precisely these differences in the desire to hedge
positions and diversify risk that explain the market risk premium and its sign. Intuitively,
the further out one looks into the market, the less incentivized consumers are to contract
commodity forwards; however the producers’ desire to hedge does not diminish as quickly.
We associate situations where π(t, T ) > 0 (a positive market risk premium) with markets
where the consumers’ desire to cover their positions ‘outweighs that of the producers.
Conversely situations where π(t, T ) < 0 (a negative market risk premium) result when the
producers’ desire to hedge their positions outweighs that of the consumers.
In order to explain the market risk premium and the driving forces that give rise
to it we organize the rest of the article as follows. Section 2 discusses the notion of
a representative producer and a representative consumer. Based on their preferences we
calculate an attainable set of forward prices where the two representative agents are willing
to trade forward contracts. Section 3 discusses clearing market forward prices and the
relative ‘market power’ agents have over these prices. Section 4 examines the market price
of risk and market risk premium implied by our model under different assumptions. Section
5 applies our model to German electricity data and Section 6 concludes.
2 Representative agents, price dynamics and forward
price bounds
In this section we describe producers’ and consumers’ preferences via the utility function
of two representative agents. As an example we look at the wholesale electricity markets
where we model the dynamics of the spot price as a stochastic process. Agents must decide
how to manage their exposure to the spot and forward markets for every future date T .
A key question for the producer is how much of his future production, which cannot be
predicted with total certainty, will he wish to sell on the forward market or, when the
time comes, sell it on the spot market. Similarly, the consumer must decide how much of
her future needs, which cannot be predicted with full certainty either, will be acquired via
the forward markets and how much on the spot. Clearly, as described above, both agents
have the incentive to enter the forward market in the interest of risk diversification. We
approach this financial decision and equilibrium price formation in two steps. First, we
determine the forward price that makes the agents indifferent between the forward and spot
market and, second, we discuss how the relative willingness of producers and consumers
to hedge their exposures determines market clearing prices.
We assume that the risk preferences of the representative agents are expressed in terms
of an exponential utility function parameterized by the risk aversion constant γ > 0;
U(x) = 1− exp(−γx) .
We let γ := γp for the producer and γ := γc for the consumer. The two agents can choose
whether to act in the spot or the forward market. The forward market consists of contracts
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delivering the spot (physically, or in money terms) over a given delivery period. Typical
examples can be the electricity or gas markets. In the latter the forward contracts have
a monthly delivery period, while in the electricity market, which will be the particular
case discussed in the remaining of this article, the contracts may have different periods of
settlement, ranging from daily, through weekly and up to even yearly.
We want to derive bounds for forward prices through the principle of certainty equiva-
lence between the two markets. In particular, we will obtain an upper bound, given by the
maximum price the consumer is willing to pay before switching to the spot market, and a
lower bound given by the producer’s lowest forward price he is willing to trade at before
switching to the spot market. These two bounds restrict forward prices to a set of feasible
forward equilibrium prices and we postpone until section 3 the discussion of how market
clearing forward prices are singled out from this feasible set.
2.1 Producers and consumers forward price bounds
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space equipped with a filtration Ft. Following Luc´ıa and
Schwartz [5] and Benth, Kallsen and Meyer-Brandis [1] we assume that the electricity spot
price follows a mean-reverting multi-factor additive process
St = Λ(t) +
m∑
i=1
Xi(t) +
n∑
j=1
Yj(t) (2.1)
where Λ(t) is the deterministic seasonal spot price level, while Xi(t) and Yj(t) are the
solutions to the stochastic differential equations
dXi(t) = −αiXi(t) dt+ σi(t) dBi(t) (2.2)
and
dYj(t) = −βjYj(t) dt+ dLj(t). (2.3)
Here, Bi(t), i = 1, . . . , m, are standard independent Brownian motions and Lj(t), j =
1, . . . , n are independent Le´vy processes.2 Let σi(t) be (possibly seasonal) deterministic
volatility functions. The processes Yj(t) are zero-mean reverting processes responsible for
the spikes or large deviations which revert at a fast rate βj > 0, while Xi(t) are zero-mean
reverting processes that account for the normal variations in the spot price evolution with
mean-reversion αi > 0.
We suppose that the Le´vy processes are exponentially integrable in the sense that there
exists a constant κ > 0 such that ∫
|z|≥1
eκ˜z ℓj(dz) <∞ , (2.4)
2In commodities markets one can expect to observe seasonal jumps. In this case we may use inho-
mogeneous Le´vy or Sato processes which are processes with independent increments [4] [9]. Only minor
technical changes in what follows are required.
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for all κ˜ ≤ κ and j = 1, . . . , n. This implies that the spot price process S(t) has exponential
moments up to order κ, and that the log-moment generating functions defined by
φj(x) = lnE
[
exLj(1)
]
, j = 1, . . . , n , (2.5)
exist for |x| ≤ κ where ℓj is the Le´vy measure of the process Lj(t). In the sequel we shall
assume that κ is sufficiently large to make the necessary exponential moments of Lj(t)
finite.
Assume that the producer will deliver the spot over the time interval [T1, T2]. He has
the choice to deliver the production in the spot market, where he faces uncertainty in the
prices over the delivery period, or to sell a forward contract with delivery over the same
period. The producer takes this decision at time t ≤ T1.
We determine the forward price that makes the producer indifferent between the two
alternatives, denoted by Fpr(t, T1, T2), from the equation
1− EP
[
exp
(
−γp
∫ T2
T1
S(u) du
)
| Ft
]
= 1− EP [exp (−γp(T2 − T1)Fpr(t, T1, T2)) | Ft] ,
or equivalently,
Fpr(t, T1, T2) = − 1
γp
1
T2 − T1 lnE
P
[
exp
(
−γp
∫ T2
T1
S(u) du
)
| Ft
]
, (2.6)
where for simplicity we have assumed that the risk-free interest rate is zero. Note that∫ T2
T1
S(u) du is what the producer collects from selling the commodity on the spot market
over the delivery period [T1, T2], while he receives (T2 − T1)Fpr(t, T1, T2) from selling it on
the forward market.
In the Proposition below we employ the spot dynamics (2.1) to explicitly calculate
the indifference forward price. For ease of presentation we introduce the notation for the
following functions. For i = 1, . . . , m and j = 1, . . . , n,
α¯i(s, T1, T2) =
{ 1
αi
(
e−αi(T1−s) − e−αi(T2−s)) , s ≤ T1 ,
1
αi
(
1− e−αi(T2−s)) , s ≥ T1 . (2.7)
and
β¯j(s, T1, T2) =
{
1
βj
(
e−βj(T1−s) − e−βj(T2−s)) , s ≤ T1 ,
1
βj
(
1− e−βj(T2−s)) , s ≥ T1 . (2.8)
Proposition 2.1. The price for which the producer is indifferent between the forward and
spot market is given by
Fpr(t, T1, T2) =
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
T1
Λ(u) du+
m∑
i=1
α¯i(t, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 Xi(t) +
n∑
j=1
β¯j(t, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 Yj(t)
− γp
2(T2 − T1)
∫ T2
t
m∑
i=1
σ2i (s)α¯
2
i (s, T1, T2) ds
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− 1
γp
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
t
n∑
j=1
φj
(−γpβ¯j(s, T1, T2)) ds ,
where α¯i and β¯j are given by (2.7) and (2.8) respectively.
Proof. Suppose for simplicity that m = n = 1. We calculate the conditional expectation
in (2.6). First observe that∫ T2
T1
S(u) du =
∫ T2
T1
Λ(u) du+
∫ T2
T1
X(u) du+
∫ T2
T1
Y (u) du .
Inserting the explicit dynamics of X(u) and appealing to the stochastic Fubini Theorem
(see e.g. Protter [8]), we find∫ T2
T1
X(u) du =
∫ T2
T1
{
X(t)e−α(u−t) +
∫ u
t
σ(s)e−α(u−s) dBs
}
du
= X(t)α¯(t, T1, T2) +
∫ T2
T1
∫ u
t
σ(s)e−α(u−s) dBs du
= X(t)α¯(t, T1, T2) +
∫ T2
t
σ(s)α¯(s, T1, T2) dBs .
A similar calculation for
∫ T2
T1
Y (u) du yields,∫ T2
T1
Y (u)du = Y (t)β¯(t, T1, T2) +
∫ T2
t
β¯(s, T1, T2) dL(s) .
Thus, since X(t) and Y (t) are measurable with respect to Ft and using the independent
increment properties of the Brownian motion and the Le´vy process, we get,
E
[
exp
(
−γpr
∫ T2
T1
S(u) du
)
| Ft
]
= exp
(
−γpr
(∫ T2
T1
Λ(u) du+X(t)α¯(t, T1, T2) + Y (t)β¯(t, T1, T2)
))
× E
[
exp
(
−γpr
∫ T2
T1
σ(s)α¯(s, T1, T2) dBs
)]
× E
[
exp
(
−γpr
∫ T2
T1
β¯(s, T1, T2) dL(s)
)]
,
= exp
(
−γpr
(∫ T2
T1
Λ(u) du+X(t)α¯(t, T1, T2) + Y (t)β¯(t, T1, T2)
))
× exp
(
1
2
γ2pr
∫ T2
t
σ2(s)α¯2(s, T1, T2) ds
)
× exp
(∫ T2
t
φ(−γprβ¯(s, T1, T2)) ds
)
.
Thus, the Proposition is proved after taking logarithms and dividing by the risk aversion
and length of the delivery period.
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Before proceeding we can interpret how jumps in the model affect the indifference price
calculated in Proposition 2.1 for the producer. For simplicity, if we assume that for the
jump processes Lj(t), j = 1, · · · , n, each process can only jump either up or down it is
straightforward to see how Fpr(t, T1, T2) is affected by each jump process. Suppose Lj(t)
is a process of only positive jumps. Then, the log-moment generating function φj(x) of
Lj(t) is an increasing function with φj(0) = 0. Thus, when x < 0, φj(x) < 0, and since
β¯j is positive, we have that the argument of φj(·) in the indifference price of the producer
is negative, and thus the jump process Lj(t) causes an increase in the indifference forward
price. On the other hand, if Lj(t) only exhibits negative jumps, we see that the indifference
price is pushed downwards. This is intuitively clear because the producer is willing to
accept lower forward prices when there is a risk of price drops in the spot market, whereas
positive price spikes work to the advantage of the producer, and he will be more reluctant
to enter forward contracts that miss opportunities where he might be better-off selling in
the spot market.
The consumer will derive the indifference price from the incurred expenses in the spot
or forward market, which entails
1−EP
[
exp
(
−γc
(
−
∫ T2
T1
S(u) du
))
| Ft
]
= 1−EP [exp (−γc(−(T2 − T1)Fc(t, T1, T2))) | Ft] ,
(2.9)
or,
Fc(t, T1, T2) =
1
γc
1
T2 − T1 lnE
P
[
exp
(
γc
∫ T2
T1
S(u) du
)
| Ft
]
. (2.10)
We calculate the following price for the consumer.
Proposition 2.2. The price that makes the consumer indifferent between the forward and
the spot market is given by
Fc(t, T1, T2) =
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
T1
Λ(u) du+
m∑
i=1
α¯i(t, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 Xi(t) +
β¯j(t, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 Yj(t)
+
γc
2(T2 − T1)
∫ T2
t
m∑
i=1
σ2i (s)α¯
2
i (s, T1, T2) ds
+
1
γc
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
t
n∑
j=1
φj
(
γcβ¯j(s, T1, T2)
)
ds .
Proof. The proof is similar as in the producer’s case.
Note that the producer prefers to sell his production in the forward market as long as
the market forward price F (t, T1, T2) is higher than Fpr(t, T1, T2). On the other hand, the
consumer prefers the spot market if the market forward price is more expensive than his
indifference price Fc(t, T1, T2). Thus, we have the bounds
Fpr(t, T1, T2) ≤ F (t, T1, T2) ≤ Fc(t, T1, T2) . (2.11)
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Letting the risk aversion of the producer go to zero, we end up with the expected
earnings from selling in the spot market, also known as the forecasted forward price. We
observe the same with the indifference price of the consumer when her risk aversion tends
to zero.
Proposition 2.3. It holds
lim
γp,c↓0
Fpr,c(t, T1, T2) = E
P
[
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
T1
S(u) du | Ft
]
=
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
T1
Λ(u) du+
m∑
i=1
α¯i(t, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 Xi(t) +
n∑
j=1
β¯j(t, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 Yj(t)
+
m∑
j=1
φ′j(0)
T2 − T1
∫ T2
t
β¯j(s, T1, T2) ds .
Moreover, we find that
Fpr(t, T1, T2) ≤ EP
[
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
T1
S(u) du |S(t)
]
≤ Fc(t, T1, T2) .
Proof. The first part is straightforward. The second part results from applying Jensen’s
inequality.
3 Forward price and the market power
Inequality (2.11) clearly indicates a range of prices where the producer and consumer are
willing to attain a deal. Aggregate demand and supply will ultimately determine the
clearing forward prices within this range. Previously we mentioned that the ‘appetite’
for risk diversification varies across consumers and producers, depending on their degree of
risk-aversion. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that the desire to hedge exposure to
market uncertainties will also vary with the horizon agents are looking at. In circumstances
where there are not a large number of consumers hedging long-term positions, whilst at
the same time producers are eager to hedge their exposure, we say that consumers have
market power. Similarly, in situations (usually short-term horizons) where a large amount
of consumers come to market to cover their positions, the balance of power tilts over to
the producers.
We introduce the deterministic function p(t, T1, T2) ∈ [0, 1] describing the market power
of the representative producer which therefore depends on time t and delivery period.
If the producer has full market power, corresponding to p(t, T1, T2) = 1, he can charge
the maximum price possible in the forward market. This will be equal to the maximum
price that the consumer can accept, namely Fc(t, T1, T2), since the consumer will leave the
forward market for any higher price. On the other hand, if the consumer has full power, ie
p(t, T1, T2) = 0, she will drive the forward price as far down as possible which corresponds
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to Fpr(t, T1, T2). For any market power 0 < p(t, T1, T2) < 1, the forward price F
p(t, T1, T2)
is defined to be
F p(t, T1, T2) = p(t, T1, T2)Fc(t, T1, T2) + (1− p(t, T1, T2))Fpr(t, T1, T2). (3.1)
In the most general setting, it would be possible to allow for a stochastic market power,
being for instance dependent on the spot price dynamics. However, in this paper we shall
constrain ourselves to the much simpler case of a deterministic market power. In some
examples we consider it as a constant for simplicity, but in the empirical study of Section
5 we find evidence of a term structure for the market power.
The explicit dynamics for the forward price are easily stated as:
Proposition 3.1. The forward price dynamics are given by
F p(t, T1, T2) =
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
T1
Λ(u) du+
m∑
i=1
α¯i(t, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 Xi(t) +
n∑
j=1
β¯j(t, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 Yj(t)
+
p(t, T1, T2)(γpr + γc)− γpr
2(T2 − T1)
∫ T2
t
m∑
i=1
σ2i (s)α¯
2
i (s, T1, T2) ds
+
p(t, T1, T2)
γc(T2 − T1)
∫ T2
t
n∑
j=1
φj(γcβ¯j(s, T1, T2)) ds
− 1− p(t, T1, T2)
γpr(T2 − T1)
∫ T2
t
n∑
j=1
φj(−γcβ¯j(s, T1, T2)) ds ,
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T1 < T2.
Given the market power p(t, T1, T2), F
p(t, T1, T2) is the price that the consumer and
producer agree upon in the market. Since p(t, T1, T2) ∈ [0, 1], this forward price will be in
between the producer’s and the consumer’s indifference price, so both are willing to accept
such a price.
Let us discuss the correlation structure between forward contracts with different delivery
periods. For simplicity we start with the case of no jumps (m = 0), and consider forward
prices for two contracts with non-overlapping delivery periods [T1, T2] and [T3, T4]. By the
explicit form of F p(t, T1, T2) and the independence of the Brownian motions, we easily
calculate
Cov (F p(t, T1, T2), F
p(t, T3, T4)) =
m∑
i=1
α¯i(t, T1, T2)α¯i(t, T3, T4)
(T2 − T1)(T4 − T3)
∫ t
0
σ2i (s)e
−2αi(t−s) ds .
The correlation between two contracts can be estimated from market price data, and thus
we can estimate the speeds of mean reversion αi by calibrating the theoretical correlation
to the empirical. Taking jumps into account will give rise to a structure where we can
include the possibility of jump correlation between forward contracts. We see that it is the
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multi-factor spot model which implies the correlation structure for the forward contracts.
This resembles the market models in fixed-income theory, the so-called LIBOR models,
where one models each LIBOR rate separately, and include a correlation structure among
the different rates. Further, it is also a known fact that forward contracts in energy markets
are not perfectly correlated, but each contract has its intrinsic risk. Note that the market
power function is not contributing to the correlation between two contracts.
4 The market price of risk and market risk premium
The standard way to price a forward contract is to find the conditional risk-neutral expected
value of the future delivery from the contract. The risk-neutral probability is usually
chosen to be related to what is called the market price of risk, which can be seen as a drift
adjustment in the dynamics of an asset to reflect how investors are compensated for bearing
risk when holding the asset.3 One of the peculiarities of commodities markets is that the
market price of risk may be either positive or negative depending on the time horizon
considered. In Schwartz [11] the calibration of one-factor models to futures prices of oil
and copper delivered negative market prices of risk in both cases. Cartea and Figueroa [2]
model England and Wales wholesale electricity prices and estimate a negative market price
of risk. Cartea and Williams [3] model gas prices and forward contracts where a positive
market price of risk for long-term contracts is observed and for short-term contracts the
market price of risk, although positive on average, changes signs across time. In this section
we want to relate the market power p(t, T1, T2) to the market price of risk. By working
with a parametrization of the market price of risk via a class of risk-neutral probabilities
introduced by an Esscher transform, we shall see that there are explicit connections between
the market power and both the market price of risk and the market risk premium. Further,
to ensure an arbitrage-free forward market, we need to have certain conditions on the
number of factors and contracts traded in the market. In commodities markets, especially
electricity models, the connection between the physical and risk-neutral measure is usually
performed by introducing a correction in the drift of the physical process to reflect how
market participants are compensated for bearing risk, see for example [11] [10] [5] [2] [3].
We point out that this widely employed change of measure in the literature is the result of
applying the Esscher transform to the physical measure which is what we propose to use
in this article.
Suppose that we want to price a forward contract with delivery over the period [T1, T2].
The forward price is defined as
FQ(t, T1, T2) = E
Q
[
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
T1
S(u) du | Ft
]
,
where we use FQ to indicate the dependency on the chosen risk-neutral probability Q.
We parameterize the market price of risk by introducing a probability measure Qθ :=
QB×QL, where QB is a Girsanov transform of the Brownian motionsBi(t), QL is an Esscher
3Note that the market price of risk is not what we have defined as the market risk premium.
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transform of the jump processes Lj(t), and θ is an R
n+m-valued function describing the
market price of risk. We define the measure change as follows. For t ≤ T , with T ≥ T2
being a finite time horizon encapsulating all the delivery periods in the market, let the
probability QB have the density process
ZB(t) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
m∑
i=1
θB,i(t)
σi(s)
dBi(s)− 1
2
∫ t
0
m∑
i=1
θ2B,i(s)
σ2i (s)
ds
)
,
where we have supposed that the functions θB,i/σi, i = 1, . . . , m, are square integrable over
[0, T ]. This measure change in the Wiener coordinates is given by the Girsanov transform,
dWi(t) = −θB,i(t)
σi(t)
dt+ dBi(t) ,
whereWi(t) become Brownian motions on [0, T ], i = 1, . . . , m. The functions θB,i represent
the compensation market players obtain for bearing the risk introduced by the non-extreme
variations in the market, i.e. the diffusion component. We let it be time dependent to allow
for variations across different seasons throughout the year. Later, we shall see that it could
even be dependent on the delivery period, indicating that the market price of diffusion risk
depends on the forward under consideration. This Girsanov change gives the dynamics
(for 1 ≤ i ≤ m)
dXi(t) = (θB,i(t)− αiXi(t)) dt+ σi(t) dWi(t) ,
and thus we have added a time-dependent level of mean-reversion to the processes Xi(t).
Further, define for bounded functions θL,j , j = 1, . . . , n,
ZL(t) = exp
(∫ t
0
n∑
j=1
θL,j(s) dLj(s)−
∫ t
0
n∑
j=1
φj(θL,j(s)) ds
)
,
for t ≤ T2, and let the density process for the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the measure
change in the jump component be
dQL
dP
∣∣∣∣
Ft
= ZL(t) .
This is the so-called Esscher transform, and the time dependent functions θL,j(t) are the
market prices of jump risk. We let θ := (θB, θL), where θB := (θB,i)
m
i=1 and θL := (θL,j)
n
j=1.
The density process of the probability Qθ becomes Z(t) := ZB(t)ZL(t). Further, we denote
by EQ
θ
the expectation with respect to the probability measure Qθ.
The forward price F θ resulting from the market price of risk specification given by Qθ
is derived in the next Proposition.
Proposition 4.1. The forward price F θ(t, T1, T2) is given by
F θ(t, T1, T2) =
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
T1
Λ(u) du+
m∑
i=1
α¯i(t, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 Xi(t) +
n∑
j=1
β¯j(t, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 Yj(t)
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+∫ T2
t
m∑
i=1
θB,i(s)
α¯i(s, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 ds+
∫ T2
t
n∑
j=1
φ′j(θL,j(s))
β¯j(s, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 ds .
(4.1)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T1 < T2.
Proof. For simplicity suppose m = n = 1. In line with the calculations for the producer’s
and consumer’s indifference prices, and from the explicit representation of X(t) under Qθ
as
X(u) = X(t)eα(u−t) +
∫ u
t
θB(s)e
−α(u−s) ds+
∫ u
t
σ(u)e−α(u−s) dW (s) ,
for u ≥ t, we find
E
Qθ
[
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
T1
S(u) du | Ft
]
=
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
T1
Λ(u) du+X(t)
α¯(t, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 + Y (t)
β¯(t, T1, T2)
T2 − T1
+
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
T1
∫ u
t
θB(s)e
−α(u−s) ds du
+
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
T1
E
QL
[∫ u
t
e−β(u−s) dLs | Ft
]
du .
By Bayes’ Theorem and the independent increment property of the Le´vy process, we see
that the expectation in the last integral is
E
QL
[∫ u
t
e−β(u−s) dL(s) | Ft
]
= EP
[∫ u
t
e−β(u−s) dL(s)
ZL(u)
ZL(t)
| Ft
]
= EP
[∫ u
t
e−β(u−s) dL(s)e
∫ u
t
θL(s) dL(s)−
∫ u
t
φ(θL(s)) ds
]
=
d
dx
E
P
[
e
∫ u
t (xe−β(u−s)+θL(s)) dL(s)
]
|x=0 × e−
∫ u
t
φ(θL(s)) ds
=
d
dx
e
∫ u
t
φ(xe−β(u−s)+θL(s)) ds|x=0 × e−
∫ u
t
φ(θL(s)) ds
=
∫ u
t
φ′(θL)e
−β(u−s) ds .
After reorganizing the integrals the result follows.
To gain insight into how the market risk premium depends on diffusion and jump risk
we look at the following two corollaries. The first one assumes that the market price of
jump risk be zero. The second one assumes that the market price of diffusion risk is zero.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose that the market price of jump risk is zero, i.e. θL,j(s) = 0 for
j = 1, . . . , n. Then
F θ(t, T1, T2) = E
P
[
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
T1
S(u) du | Ft
]
+
∫ T2
t
m∑
i=1
θB,i(s)
α¯i(s, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 ds .
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Proof. This is straightforward from the results above.
Thus, from this we see that when market players are not compensated for bearing jump
risk, the market risk premium is positive as long as
π(t, T1, T2) =
∫ T2
t
m∑
i=1
θB,i(s)
α¯i(s, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 ds
is positive. As a particular case we can assume all θB,i(t)’s to be positive constants which
yields a positive market price of risk since α¯i are positive functions for all s ≤ T2. However,
in the more general setting, one can obtain a change in the sign of the market risk premium
over time t by appropriate specification of the functions θB,i(t). Furthermore, although
changes in the sign of the market price of risk are also of particular interest, it is clear that
a change in the sign of the market prices of risk θB,i(t) does not always imply a change in
the sign of the market risk premium.
Now we turn our attention to the case with no diffusion market price of risk, i.e.
θB,i(t) = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , m.
Corollary 4.3. Suppose that θB,i(t) = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , m. Then
F θ(t, T1, T2) = E
P
[
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
T1
S(u) du | Ft
]
+
∫ T2
t
n∑
j=1
{
φ′j(θL,j(s))− φ′j(0)
} β¯j(s, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 ds .
Proof. Follows from the results above.
Note that the market risk premium in this case is given by
π(t, T1, T2) =
∫ T2
t
n∑
j=1
{
φ′j(θL,j(s))− φ′j(0)
} β¯j(s, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 ds ,
and even if we assume constant and positive θL,j > 0, the sign of π(t, T1, T2) will depend
on the monotonicity of φ′j. In general, the sign of the market risk premium will result from
a combination of θL,j(t) and the monotonicity properties of φ
′
j.
Finally, when both the market price of jump and diffusion risk are taken into account,
the market risk premium is given by
π(t, T1, T2) =
∫ T2
t
m∑
i=1
θB,i(s)
α¯i(s, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 ds+
∫ T2
t
n∑
j=1
{
φ′j(θL,j(s))− φ′j(0)
} β¯j(s, T1, T2)
T2 − T1 ds .
(4.2)
Now we proceed to relate the market risk premium (4.2) to the market power p(t, T1, T2).
Comparing the expressions of F θ given by (4.1) and F p calculated in Proposition 3.1, we
have that the sum of the last two terms of F p must match the sum of the two last terms
of F θ. Hence, we must find a solution θ = (θB, θL) to the equation∫ T2
t
m∑
i=1
θB,i(s)α¯i(s, T1, T2) ds+
∫ T2
t
n∑
j=1
φ′j(θL,j(s))β¯j(s, T1, T2) ds
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=
1
2
[p(t, T1, T2)(γpr + γc)− γpr]
∫ T2
t
m∑
i=1
σ2i (s)α¯
2
i (s, T1, T2) ds
+
p(t, T1, T2)
γc
∫ T2
t
n∑
j=1
φj(γcβ¯j(s, T1, T2)) ds
− 1− p(t, T1, T2)
γpr
∫ T2
t
n∑
j=1
φj(−γprβ¯j(s, T1, T2)) ds . (4.3)
We have n +m unknown functions θB,i and θL,j , i = 1, . . . , m, j = 1, . . . , n. If the market
consists of k contracts with non-overlapping delivery periods, we may find a solution as
long as k ≤ m+n. We need at least one solution θ = (θB, θL) in order to have an arbitrage-
free market of forward contracts. Suppose for instance that n = 0, that is, there are no
jumps in the market. In this case we have k linear equations for the m unknown functions
where we find at least one solution as long as k ≤ m and the mean reversion coefficients
αi are different. If m > 0 and n > 0 we have both diffusion and jumps in the model, and
we may simply choose θL,j freely, and then solve for the remaining unknowns θB,j given
by equation (4.3) for each k delivery periods. There is at least one solution when k ≤ m
for this situation whenever the αi’s are different. One way is to choose θL,j(t) = 0, which
means that there is no price for jump risk incurred by the market, see for example Merton
[6]. We remark in passing that if we chose a spot model with just two factors (for example
m = n = 1), and the market trades in more than two forward contracts, there may be no
solution to the equations (4.3) for all the different contracts at once. Solving the equations
in (4.3) for each contract separately leads to solutions which are dependent on the delivery
period, and will not give one risk neutral measure for the market as a whole, but one
measure for each contract separately; allowing for arbitrage opportunities.
In the rest of this section we look at two illustrative examples to gain further insights
into the model before applying it to German data in Section 5. First we shall demonstrate
that for a simple Poisson jump model and constant market power, the market risk premium
changes sign across time. Second, we explore the case of fixed time delivery without the
presence of jumps and look explicitly at how π(t, T ) depends on the parameters p(t, T ),
γpr and γc.
4.1 An example with constant market power and Poisson jumps
We consider a forward market consisting of 52 contracts with weekly delivery. The market
power is supposed to be constant p(t, T1, T2) = p ∈ [0, 1]. Assume that the spot model has
m = 52 diffusion components Xi(t), and one (n = 1) jump component Y (t). Suppose that
the seasonal function is
Λ(t) = 150 + 20 cos(2πt/365) ,
and the mean-reversion parameters for the diffusion components are αi = 0.067/i, with
volatility σi = 0.3/
√
i, for i = 1, . . . , 52. We mimic here a sequence of mean-reverting
processes with decreasing speeds of mean reversion and with decreasing volatility. Note
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that a speed of mean reversion equal to 0.067 means that a shock will be halved over 10
days. The jump process is driven by L(t) = ηN(t), where N(t) is a Poisson process with
intensity λ and the jump size is constant, equal to η. The mean-reversion for the jump
component is β = 0.5, meaning that a jump will, on average, revert back in two days.
Thus, we have a combination of slow mean reverting normal variations and fast mean
reverting spikes in the spot market. The frequency of spikes is set to λ = 2/365, i.e. two
spikes, on average, per year. Time t = 0 corresponds to January 1, and we assume that
the initial spot price is S(0) = 172. In our empirical investigations, we let X1(0) = 2,
and Xi(0) = Y (0) = 0 for i = 2, . . . , 52 to achieve this. The risk aversion coefficients of
the producer and consumer are set equal to γc = γpr = 0.5. In the examples below we
derive forward curves for weakly settled forward contracts over a year. We remark that
this model is chosen for its simplicity and to illustrate the approach in this paper.
Consider first a positive jump of size η = 10. In Fig. 1 we have plotted the indifference
forward curves for the producer and consumer (‘×’), together with the forward curves with
constant market power equal to p = 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 (marked as dashed lines, in increasing
order). Finally, we have included the forecasted spot price curve as ‘+’. We clearly see
that the forecasted price curve follows a shape similar to the seasonal function, while the
indifference price curves have very different shapes in the short end. As expected, market
clearing forward prices are increasing with increasing market power, since the producer will
command higher prices with more power. Note also that for a low market power of 0.25,
we still observe that the forecasted price curve is below the forward curve in the shorter
end, while in the medium to long end we see the opposite. This corresponds to a positive
market risk premium in the shorter end, whereas it becomes negative in the medium and
longer end. Both players have the same risk aversion, and the consumer wishes to avoid
upward jumps in the price. Hence, even for a weak producer, the consumer is willing to
accept a positive market risk premium in the short end. In the long end, the effect of jumps
vanish as a consequence of mean reversion and the consumer will have more power driving
the market risk premium below zero. To illustrate this particular example with p = 0.5 we
have plotted the difference of the forward curve with market power 0.25 and the forecasted
curve in Fig. 2. For the contracts with delivery up to approximately week 20, the market
premium is positive. The premium decreases with time to delivery, and becomes negative
in the medium and long end.
Turning our attention to the case of negative jumps, we observe the reverse picture.
Suppose that jumps sizes are fixed at η = −10. Fig. 3 shows the corresponding forward and
indifference curves together with the forecasted price. We observe first of all that all curves
are shifted downwards, indicating that the producer is willing to accept lower forward prices
to hedge the possibility of sudden drops in prices. In the short-term we observe, for all
cases of market power, that the forecasted spot price is above forward prices, i.e. negative
market risk premium. In the long-term, only when producer’s market power is high, that is
0.75, we have the situation where the forecasted curve is below the forward curve signaling
that the consumer bears a positive risk premium. Moreover, Fig. 4 shows the difference
between the forward curve and the forecasted curve when the producer’s market power is
p = 0.75.
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Figure 1: The indifference price curves together with the forward curves for market powers
equal to p = 0.25, 0.5 and p = 0.75, in increasing order. The forecasted curve is depicted
‘+’. The jumps are positive of size 10
We now proceed to analyze more closely the implications of jumps and normal vari-
ations of the model. We consider the case with m = n = 1 and constant market power
p(t, T1, T2) = p for p ∈ [0, 1]. Further, let L(t) = N(t), a Poisson process with constant
jump intensity λ > 0. Note that this model has only two factors, and in general it will
not give an arbitrage-free forward curve dynamics for a market which trades in contracts
with many different delivery periods. However, this simplification provides us with some
insight into how the sign of the market risk premium may change, and we include it with
the assumption that we have one forward contract with delivery period [T1, T2] traded in
the market.
Consider equation (4.3). One way to solve this is to separate the Wiener and jump
part, and solve the two resulting equations. We find the solution
θB(t, T1, T2) =
1
2
(p(γpr + γc)− γpr) σ2(t)α¯(t, T1, T2) , (4.4)
for t ≤ T2. Note that the sign of θB depends on the sign of p(γpr + γc) − γpr, since σ2(t)
and α¯(t, T1, T2) are positive. We have a negative market price of risk θB whenever
p <
γpr
γpr + γc
. (4.5)
If for instance γpr = γc, the market price of risk θB becomes negative whenever p < 0.5,
which corresponds to the consumer being the strongest. If the producer is stronger, ie
p > 0.5, he is the superior power in forming prices and the market price of risk becomes
positive. If γpr 6= γc, the market power needs to be less than the relative risk aversion of
the producer against the total risk aversion for θB to be negative.
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Figure 2: The market risk premium given by the difference of the forward curve with
market power 0.25 and the forecasted curve
Let us consider the market price of jump risk. Since L(t) is assumed to be a Poisson
process, the log-moment generating function is given by
φ(x) = λ(ex − 1) and φ′(x) = λex .
Note that
φ′(θL(t))− φ′(0) = λ(eθL(t) − 1)
which is positive whenever θL(t) > 0, and negative if θL(t) < 0, as expected following the
interpretation of Corollary 4.3. The equation for the jump risk derived from splitting (4.3)
into two equations becomes (after differentiating with respect to t)
λeθL(t)β¯(t, T1, T2) =
p
γc
λ(eγcβ¯(t,T1,T2) − 1)− 1− p
γpr
λ(e−γprβ¯(t,T1,T2) − 1) .
Or, equivalently,
β¯(t, T1, T2)e
θL(t,T1,T2) =
p
γc
(eγcβ¯(t,T1,T2) − 1) + 1− p
γpr
(1− e−γprβ¯(t,T1,T2)) . (4.6)
Note that the right-hand side of (4.6) is positive since β¯(t, T1, T2) > 0. Thus, the market
price of jump risk is negative whenever
p
γc
(eγcβ¯(t,T1,T2) − 1) + 1− p
γpr
(1− e−γprβ¯(t,T1,T2)) < β¯(t, T1, T2) ,
and positive otherwise. The following Lemma is helpful in understanding when the market
price of jump risk is negative.
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Figure 3: The indifference price curves together with the forward curves for market powers
equal to p = 0.25, 0.5 and p = 0.75, in increasing order. The forecasted curve is depicted
with ‘*’. The jumps are negative of size 10
Lemma 4.4. The non-negative function f : R+ 7→ R+ defined by
f(z) =
p
γc
(eγcz − 1) + 1− p
γpr
(1− e−γprz) ,
satisfies f(z) ≥ z for all z ≥ 0 when
p >
γpr
γpr + γc
.
Moreover, if
p <
γpr
γpr + γc
,
then f(z) < z for z ≤ z0, and f(z) ≥ z otherwise, where z0 is defined by f(z) = z.
Proof. Observe that f(0) = 0, and f(z)→∞ whenever z →∞. Moreover, f is monoton-
ically increasing since
f ′(z) = peγcz + (1− p)e−γcz ≥ 0 .
Consider f ′′(z):
f ′′(z) = pγce
γcz − (1− p)γpre−γprz ,
which is positive whenever p > γpr/(γc+ γpr). In that case, f
′(z) is an increasing function,
and since f ′(0) = 1, we find that f ′(z) ≥ 1, and therefore f(z) ≥ z for all z ≥ 0. This
proves the first claim. When p < γpr/(γc + γpr), we will have that f
′′(z) < 0 for z ≤ ẑ,
where ẑ is some positive constant, while f ′′(z) > 0 elsewhere. Thus, f ′(z) is decreasing,
and next increasing. Since it goes to infinity as an exponential, we need to have that there
exists z0 > 0 for which f(z0) = z0. The second claim follows.
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Figure 4: The market risk premium given by the difference of the forward curve with
market power 0.75 and the forecasted curve
Let z = β¯(t, T1, T2) in the Lemma above, and recall that by the definition of β¯(t, T1, T2)
it is increasing in t ≤ T1 and decreasing in T1 < t ≤ T2. Its maximum is in t = T1, where it
takes the value β¯(T1, T1, T2) = (1−e−β(T2−T1))/β. If this maximum is less than z0, the jump
risk θL(t, T1, T2) will be negative for all t ≤ T2. Consider the situation where the maximum
is greater than z0. Observe that β¯(0, T1, T2) = (e
−βT1 − e−βT2)/β and β¯(T2, T1, T2) = 0. If
β¯(0, T1, T2) ≥ z0, there exists one t0 such that β¯(t0, T1, T2) = z0. In this case we find that
θL(t, T1, T2) > 0 for t < t0, and θL(t, T1, T2) < 0 for t > t0. If β¯(0, T1, T2) < z0, we have
the existence of t0 < t1 being such that β¯(t, T1, T2) = z0, t = t0, t1. Then θL(t, T1, T2) is
negative for t ≤ t0, positive on the interval t ∈ (t0, t1) and negative again on t ∈ (t1, T2).
Therefore, we may have a situation where the market price of jump risk becomes positive
giving a positive contribution to the forward price which makes it larger than the forecasted
spot, even in the presence of a negative contribution to the forward price coming from θB.
It is also interesting to see that on the forward curve we can have different signs of the
market risk premium depending on how far away from maturity we are on the curve. This
change of sign in the market risk premium may only take place when jumps are present
in the model, and when the market power of the producer is weaker than his relative risk
aversion to the sum of both risk aversion coefficients, see (4.5). Note that when jumps
are not present in the spot price, and we have assumed that the market price of risk is
constant, the market risk premium will only be either positive or negative, depending on
the size of the market power. In general, if we assume that there is only one factor driving
the dynamics of the spot price, then the market price of risk ought to change signs in order
to get a change in the sign of the market risk premium. Furthermore, if we assume that the
market price of risk (per factor) is constant, then we need at least two factors to observe
a change in the sign of the market risk premium.
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4.2 Fixed-delivery forwards without spike risk
To gain further insight into the forward curves implied by the certainty equivalence principle
and market power, we consider a spot market without spikes and with a constant level to
which the prices mean-revert. Thus, we consider the spot price model
dS(t) = (µ− αS(t)) dt+ σ dB(t),
where µ is a constant, α > 0, σ ≥ 0, which yields the explicit solution
S(T ) = S(t)e−α(T−t) +
µ
α
(
1− e−α(T−t))+ σ ∫ T
t
e−α(T−s) dB(s) .
The indifference price of the producer and consumer are defined as
F γppr (t, T ) = −
1
γp
E
P [exp (−γpS(T )) | Ft] and F γcc (t, T ) =
1
γc
E
P [exp (γcS(T )) | Ft] .
A straightforward calculation gives
F γppr (t, T ) = S(t)e
−α(T−t) +
µ
α
(
1− e−α(T−t))− γp σ2
4α
(
1− e−2α(T−t)) (4.7)
and
F γcc (t, T ) = S(t)e
−α(T−t) +
µ
α
(
1− e−α(T−t))+ γc σ2
4α
(
1− e−2α(T−t)) . (4.8)
For fixed delivery contracts the analogous expression to (3.1) becomes
F p(t, T ) = p(t, T )F γcc (t, T ) + (1− p(t, T ))F γppr (t, T ) (4.9)
and a simple calculation implies that
F p(t, T ) = S(t)e−α(T−t) +
µ
α
(
1− e−α(T−t))− p(t, T )γp σ2
4α
(
1− e−2α(T−t))
+(1− p(t, T ))γc σ
2
4α
(
1− e−2α(T−t)) ,
and the market risk premium becomes
π(t, T ) = (γc − p(t, T )(γp + γc)) σ
2
4α
(
1− e−2α(T−t)) .
It is straightforward to see that the sign of π(t, T ) is given by the sign of (γc − p(t, T )(γp + γc)).
Therefore, when p(t, T ) < γc/(γp + γc) we have that π(t, T ) > 0 and vice versa.
Note that we may also write the expression of the forward as:
F p(t, T ) =
µ
α
+
σ2
4α
(p(t, T )(γp + γc)− γp)
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+
(
S(t)− µ
α
)
e−α(T−t)
− (p(t, T )(γp + γc)− γp) e−2α(T−t) , (4.10)
and observe that the forward price consists of three terms, a “constant” level, a “slow”
mean-reversion level exp(−α(T − t)) and a “fast” mean-reversion level exp(−2α(T − t)).
Moreover, if we assume a constant market power p with
p <
γpr
γpr + γc
,
then the last term in (4.10) will be exponentially increasing towards zero. Further, if
S(t) > µ/α, then the exp(−α(T − t))-term will be “slowly” decreasing to zero. In effect,
we produce a hump in the forward curve. This hump will be in the short end of the curve.
5 Empirical evidence: the German market
In this section we apply our model to the German electricity market. We do this in two
steps. First we estimate the physical parameters of a two-factor model. Second, using
forward market data, denoted by F (t, T1, T2), we estimate the risk-aversion coefficients for
both producers and consumers and estimate the producer’s market power.
We employ daily spot prices, the so-called Phelix base load traded at the EEX, and
prices for forward contracts with different delivery periods: monthly, quarterly and yearly.
Our data covers the period January 2 2002 to January 1 2006 where we have 1461 spot
price observations. The forward data consist of 108 contracts with monthly delivery, 35
contracts with quarterly delivery and 12 contracts with yearly delivery.
We apply the model to
S(t) = Λ(t) +X(t) + Y (t)
where, as described above, Λ(t) is the seasonal component,
dX(t) = −αX(t)dt+ σdB(t)
dY (t) = −βY (t)dt+ dL(t)
where α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0 σ ≥ 0, B(t) is a standard Brownian motion and
L(t) =
N(t)∑
i
Ji (5.1)
is a compound Poisson process. N(t) is a homogeneous Poisson process with intensity λ
and Ji’s are i.i.d. with exponential density function
f(j) = pλ1e
−λ1j1j>0 + (1− p)λ2e−λ2|j|1j<0,
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where λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0 are responsible for the decay of the tails for the distribution of
positive and negative jump sizes and 1 is the indicator function. Finally we assume that
N(t), J and B(t) are independent.
We remark in passing that a two-factor model as we consider here will in general
violate the no-arbitrage condition for the forward market if this consists of more than
two contracts (recall the discussion in Section 4). However, the purpose of the empirical
study is to provide an insight into the market power and the market risk premium, and
thus we choose a simple and tractable model to analyze. We may, on the other hand,
to be consistent with the no-arbitrage conditions mentioned above, split the Brownian
motion part of X(t) into several factors to ensure an arbitrage-free market as required by
our conditions above. Therefore, this means that we must choose the same number of
Brownian motions as number of contracts and our results to follow will not change with
this modification.
To be able to estimate the seasonal component and the parameters of the OU and jump
processes we follow a procedure similar to that in Cartea and Figueroa [2] and Luc´ıa and
Schwartz [5]. Therefore, for the seasonal component we assume
Λ(t) = a0 + a11{t=Su} + a21{t=Mo} + a31{t=Tu,We,Th} + a41{t=Sa}
+a5 cos
[
6π
365
(t + a6)
]
+ a7t,
where the indicator function is acting on the different days of the week. The parameter
estimates for the seasonal component are shown in Table 1 and the estimates for the OU
and Jump components are shown in Table 2.4 Moreover, Table 3 shows the mean, standard
deviation, skewness and kurtosis of the spot prices and those resulting from 10,000 paths
using our model and Figure 5 shows the realized and a simulated path. It is clear that our
model captures both statistical and trajectile properties.
a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 Squared Error
19.43 -11.43 0.78 2.13 -6.13 1.2 53.64 0.016 39420.74
Table 1: Estimated coefficients of Λ(t)
α σ p λ λ1 λ2 β
0.44 5.2 0.72 0.054 0.031 0.053 0.2
Table 2: Parameter estimates for OU and Jump components
In order to calculate the market power p(t, T1, T2) and the forward premium π(t, T1, T2)
we need to choose the risk aversion coefficients for the consumer and the producer, γc and
4For more details on the estimation procedure see Metka [7].
23
Jan 02 Jul 02 Jan 03 Jul 03 Jan 04 Jul 04 Jan 05 Jul 05
50
100
150
Eu
ros
/MW
h
Spot Prices
Jan 02 Jul 02 Jan 03 Jul 03 Jan 04 Jul 04 Jan 05 Jul 05
50
100
150
200
250
Eu
ros
/MW
h
Simulated Spot Prices
Figure 5: Spot and Simulated Spot Prices
Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Empirical S(t) 31.6 15.2 2.7 14.5
Simulated S(t) 32.1 15.6 2.2 13.8
Table 3: Empirical ad simulated moments (1000 paths)
γpr respectively. Since Fc(t, T1, T2) (upper bound) and Fpr(t, T1, T2) (lower bound) depend
on the choice of γc and γpr, we estimate γpr and γc by minimizing the distance between
Fc(t, T1, T2), Fpr(t, T1, T2) and the market prices of forwards F (t, T1, T2), respectively, in
the following way.
We examine the time range t = 1 = 02/Jan/2002 until t = 1461 = 31/Dec/2005. For
most days (excluding weekends and holidays) we have prices for forward contracts with
delivery one month, three months (quarter) and twelve months (year). As long as there is
a price on day t, we determine all values of γpr and γc such that
Fpr(t, T1, T2) ≤ F (t, T1, T2) ≤ Fc(t, T1, T2) (5.2)
and introduce intervals which contain the risk aversion parameters. For all trading days t ∈
[1, 1461], we define the intervals I tpr and I
t
c containing values for γpr and γc by guaranteeing
that (5.2) holds. Thus, to find the ranges for the parameters of risk aversion we implement
the following algorithm:
• t = 1 : Determine valid intervals I1pr and I
1
c such that Fpr(1, T1, T2) ≤ F (1, T1, T2) ≤
Fc(1, T1, T2), for all delivery periods [T1, T2], traded on day 1.
• t = 2 : Determine valid intervals I2pr and I
2
c such that Fpr(2, T1, T2) ≤ F (2, T1, T2) ≤
Fc(2, T1, T2), for all delivery periods [T1, T2], traded on day 2.
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• . . .
• t = 1461 : Determine valid intervals I1461pr and I
1461
c such that Fpr(1461, T1, T2) ≤
F (1461, T1, T2) ≤ Fc(1461, T1, T2), for all delivery periods [T1, T2], traded on day
1461.
This algorithm guarantees that no forward prices F (t, T1, T2) will lay outside the bounds
Fpr(t, T1, T2) and Fc(t, T1, T2). Consequently the results show that γpr ∈ [0.421,∞) and
γc ∈ [0.701,∞). In our calculations we choose γpr = 0.421 and γc = 0.701 which seems a
reasonable working assumption where producers are less risk-averse than consumers.
We continue by recalling that the market power and market risk premium are given by
p(t, T1, T2) =
F (t, T1, T2)− Fpr(t, T1, T2)
Fc(t, T1, T2)− Fpr(t, T1, T2)
and
π(t, T1, T2) = F (t, T1, T2)− EP
[
1
T2 − T1
∫ T2
T1
S(u)du|Ft
]
.
To calculate p(t, T1, T2) and π(t, T1, T2) we split the data in three non-overlapping peri-
ods. Table 4 lists the contracts we employ in every period. The key criterion is to include
in the first period all contracts that were being traded on January 2 2002. Then the second
period starts when all contracts that were being traded on January 2 2002 are no longer
traded. Finally, the third period is defined in a similar way.
t Type # Contracts Delivery Periods F (t, T1, T2)
01/Jan/2002 monthly 18 Jan 2002 - May 2003 F (2, T1, T2)
01/Jan/2002 quarterly 7 2nd qtr 2002 - 4th qtr 2003 F (2, T1, T2)
01/Jan/2002 yearly 3 2003 - 2005 F (2, T1, T2)
03/Mar/2003 monthly 7 Feb 2003 - Aug 2003 F (400, T1, T2)
03/Mar/2003 quarterly 7 2nd qtr 2003 - 4th qtr 2004 F (400, T1, T2)
03/Mar/2003 yearly 3 2004 - 2006 F (400, T1, T2)
04/Oct/2005 monthly 7 Oct 2005 - Apr 2006 F (1373, T1, T2)
04/Oct/2005 quarterly 7 1st qtr 2006 - 3rd qtr 2007 F (1373, T1, T2)
04/Oct/2005 yearly 6 2006 - 2011 F (1373, T1, T2)
Table 4: Forward contracts
Figures 6, 7 and 8 show our results when all forward contracts that were being traded
on January 2 2002 are taken into account. In other words we show the results from 18
monthly contracts, 7 quarterly contracts and 3 yearly contracts (see Table 4).
In particular, Figure 6 shows the results for the 18 monthly contracts that were trading
on January 2 2002. As expected we observe a decline in the producer’s market power as
time to delivery increases. For example, in the contract with delivery period closest to
January 2 2002 the producer’s market power is slightly over 0.80 and decreases to values
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Figure 6: Producer’s market power and market risk premium, 18 monthly contracts with
t = January 2 2002
below 0.30 corresponding to contracts that start delivery on or after March 2003. Moreover,
Figures 7 and 8 show the same behavior: a decaying market power for producers, as time
to delivery increases, for both quarterly and yearly forward contracts.
Moreover, as predicted by our theoretical examples above, the producer’s market power
is much higher in the short end for monthly contracts, Figure 6, than for quarterly and
yearly, Figures 7 and 8. In the short-term, the presence of jumps incentivizes consumer’s
to hedge against risk produced by upward spikes, i.e. exert upward pressure on demand
for forwards, whilst at the same time, producer’s have less incentives to sell forwards
when positive spikes are present. Hence, we see that monthly forward contracts, that start
delivery relatively soon, trade at a high market risk premium which in our framework is also
reflected in a high market power for producers. Furthermore, the further away the start of
the delivery period is, the presence of price spikes, due to the fast mean reverting nature
of the spot price, poses negligible risks. This situation is evident in the term structure of
the producer’s market power and market risk premium obtained from the quarterly and
yearly contracts which are roughly the same in both cases, see Figures 7 and 8.
We also depict results for the market risk premium. We see that the risk premium
π(t, T1, T2) shows a clear term structure. As expected, π(t, T1, T2) is decreasing in [T1, T2],
i.e. the further the delivery of the contract is, the smaller the risk premium. In our model,
this result can be explained by the decreasing market power that producers have; the larger
the difference T1−t, the keener producers will be, relative to consumers, to trade forwards.
Hence, forward prices will move away from the upper bound Fc(t, T1, T2). As a result, the
risk premium π(t, T1, T2) is decreasing, and at some point in time, it becomes negative.
Finally, it is interesting to compare the point in time where the risk premium changes
its sign. When looking at the term structure of π(t, T1, T2) obtained from monthly and
quarterly contracts we see that the change of sign occurs around the months of April and
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Figure 7: Producer’s market power and market risk premium, 7 quarterly contracts with
t = second quarter 2002
May.
6 Conclusions
In this article we address the important question of what gives rise to the market risk
premium. We provide a framework that allows us to explain how risk preferences of
market players explain the sign and magnitude of the market risk premium across different
forward contract maturities. A crucial step in our framework is to be able to incorporate the
relative eagerness consumers and producers show, via their respective representative agents,
to enter forward contracts. We show that there is an attainable set where consumers and
producers are willing to strike a deal, but it is this eagerness to hedge risk across different
points in time, which we label market power, what singles out a unique equilibrium price
for each forward contract.
Furthermore, these equilibrium prices that belong to the attainable set must clearly
correspond to those obtained from pricing forwards under a risk-neutral measure. There-
fore, as an illustration of our approach, we looked at wholesale electricity prices and were
able to make an explicit analytical connection between the market prices of risk and mar-
ket power with the degrees of risk aversion of the representative agents. To exemplify our
methodology further, we looked at particular examples where it was straightforward to see
how different sources of risk, for instance jump or diffusion risk, contribute to the market
risk premium and we were able to obtain and explain the very distinctive characteristics
observed in electricity markets as well as in other markets such as gas, oil, etc.
We apply our model to the German electricity market. Our empirical results endorse
our theoretical predictions. For instance, we find that over short-term horizons, and in
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Figure 8: Producer’s market power and market risk premium, 3 yearly contracts with t =
2002
the presence of spike risk, producer’s market power is at its highest. For example, in
the contracts with delivery period closest to January 2 2002 the producer’s market power
is around 0.80 and decreases to values below 0.30 corresponding to contracts that start
delivery on or after March 2003. This situation is also reflected in the market risk premium.
Monthly contracts that mature in the near future, trade at a high premium, figures in excess
of 15 Euros. And monthly contracts that start delivery in a relatively long period of time,
for instance in 6 months or longer, trade most of the time, at a high discount.
Finally, we generally observe that for each class of contract (monthly, quarterly or
yearly) the producer’s market power and the market risk premium show a term structure
that is decreasing as time to maturity of the forward contract increases.
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